Bad news from Fallujah by Zollmann, Florian
1 
 
Bad news from Fallujah 
 
By Florian Zollmann, Lecturer in Media, Director of the Archbishop Desmond Tutu 
Centre for War and Peace Studies, Liverpool Hope University 
 
Abstract 
This study uses the thematic analysis developed by the Glasgow University Media Group to 
explore how the US, UK and German national press covered the US/Coalition assault on the 
Iraqi city Fallujah in November 2004. The study relies on quantitative and qualitative full text 
content analyses to assess 428 news, editorial and commentary items. The article suggests 
that, while government and military officials of the US/Coalition had argued the military 
‘operation’ was necessary to secure Iraq and defeat an ‘insurgency’, organisations and 
actors from the Iraqi society refer to the ‘operation’ as ‘collective punishment’ and a 
‘massacre’ that targeted the Iraqi population. The article investigates how the press 
represented each of these perspectives. The findings suggest that the press overemphasised 
the US/Coalition perspective despite striking counter evidence. Critical aspects of coverage 
largely focused on tactical elements of the military dimension of the event. The article 
concludes that such findings are in accord with hegemonic models of media performance. 
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Introduction 
In April and November 2004, US/Coalition forces launched military ‘operations’ in Fallujah - 
one of the most densely populated cities in Iraq. US officials had argued the ‘operations’ were 
necessary to crush the Iraqi resistance rooted in Fallujah in order to provide security for the 
upcoming elections in Iraq. 
 
The first ‘operation’ took place about one year after US President George W. Bush had 
proclaimed the end of the 2003 Iraq War at a speech on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham 
Lincoln where he had claimed that, from then on, ‘our coalition is engaged in securing and 
reconstructing’ Iraq (cited in CNN 2003). During its ‘transition from dictatorship to 
democracy’, Bush had further stressed, the US-led Coalition would support ‘the new leaders 
of Iraq as they establish a government of, by and for the Iraqi people’ (cited in ibid).  
 
The historical and documentary record of the occupation of Iraq suggests different policy 
goals: the US/Coalition administered the privatisation of Iraq’s state-owned industries in 
accordance with the neoliberal shock-doctrine (see Klein 2007; Schwartz 2008). This policy 
aimed to divest Iraq’s resources – including its oil – by opening the economy to multinational 
corporations. 
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Shortly after the ending of the Iraq War, in September 2003, the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA), headed by US governor L. Paul Bremer III, enforced Order Number 39 to 
replace ‘all existing foreign investment law’ (Coalition Provisional Authority 2003: 2). 
Bremer also instigated the dissolution of the Ba’athist state and military apparatus leaving 
hundreds of thousands of former state and military employees unemployed.  
 
A deteriorating security situation stimulated by civic unrest against Bremer’s policies, 
inhibited foreign investment forcing the country into a downturn spiral of unemployment and 
economic depression. These developments encouraged an economically driven rebellion 
rooted in the Sunni cities of the Al Anbar Governorate where Fallujah is located (see 
Schwartz 2008). 
 
As a counter measure, the US/Coalition administered military ‘operations’ throughout 2003 
and 2004 mostly against Sunni but also Shiite resistance forces, in Baghdad, Najaf, Ramada, 
Samarra, Haditha, Baquba, al Qa’im, Mosul and Fallujah – under the umbrella of 
‘counterinsurgency offensives’ (al-Fadhily 2007; GlobalSecurity.org n.d.a). 
 
Already in April 2003, US/Coalition forces had established a base in Fallujah and at the end 
of the month, 17 unarmed demonstrators were killed by US forces (Human Rights Watch 
2003). This incident started a cycle of violence which culminated in a military ‘operation’ in 
April 2004 during which about 600 Iraqi civilians were killed (IBC 2004). Because the 
US/Coalition aimed to prevent its angered Iraqi collaborators from resigning their positions in 
the Governing Council (IGC), an Iraqi advisory body that worked under the auspices of the 
CPA, the April ‘operation’ was halted. An Al-Jazeera television team, headed by reporter and 
talk-show host Ahmed Mansour, was the only television crew in Fallujah broadcasting 
gruesome pictures out of the city. The US military had later blamed the Arab network for 
inciting the Iraqi public. 
 
After intensive preparations, which included diverse propaganda measures to restrict the 
information flow from Fallujah, the city was attacked for a second time in November 2004. 
This was the largest military ‘operation’ during the occupation. Depending on estimates, 
between 800-6,000 civilians were killed (see Jamail 2004; Marqusee 2005). 
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This study assesses US, UK and German national press news coverage of the US/Coalition 
military ‘operation’ conducted in Fallujah in November 2004. For several reasons, this case 
study can be regarded as important: First, to this date, national press news coverage of the 
occupation of Iraq more generally, and the ‘operations’ in Fallujah in particular, have not 
been systematically studied (see Robinson et al. 2010: 181). Consequently, Piers Robinson et 
al. (2010: 181) see the time period spanning the occupation ‘as important as the invasion itself 
for what it can tell us about the dynamics of news media coverage’ stressing that this period 
‘demands detailed scholarly analysis’. Secondly, the Fallujah case is important because it 
exemplifies the failures of US/Coalition ‘counter-insurgency’ strategy in Iraq. As already 
indicated, military policies had caused mass civilian death, public infrastructure damage and 
widespread rebellion in Iraq (see Schwartz 2008). Newspaper coverage of Fallujah was thus 
of great importance for the US/Coalition governments which had the aim of remaining in 
Iraq. In fact, it could be argued that a substantially critical press could have ended the 
occupation by pressuring the US and UK governments to withdraw their forces from Iraq. 
Because of its devastating outcomes, the Fallujah ‘operation’ could have provided an entry 
point for such critical coverage. The extent of critical reporting is thus to be assessed in this 
article. And finally, the Fallujah case study also sheds light on whether the press performed in 
accord with a liberal pluralist model that theorises the media as an independent and critical 
monitor of the powerful, or with a hegemonic model that theorises the media as an extension 
of the dominant state-military-corporate sector. 
 
Research on media coverage of war 
There seems to be agreement among US-American and British scholars that during 
international conflicts and wars ‘as institutions, the media have generally served the military 
rather well’ (Carruthers 2000: 271-2; see also Bennett 1990; Bennett, Lawrence and 
Livingston 2007; DiMaggio 2009; Hallin 1989; Herman and Chomsky 2008; Keeble 1997; 
Mermin 1999; Robinson et al. 2010).  
 
The poor performance of the news media can be further explained on the basis of the well 
established ‘indexing’ and ‘manufacturing consent’ models which broadly suggest that news 
media discourses are elite-driven and thus hegemonic (see Cottle 2006; McChesney 2008; 
Robinson et al. 2010). Both approaches assume that, as the US media scholar W. Lance 
Bennett (1990: 106) writes, professional journalists ‘tend to “index” the range of voices and 
viewpoints in both news and editorials according to the range of views expressed in 
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mainstream government debate’. Accordingly, non-official perspectives are only incorporated 
in news and editorials if they convey judgements already expressed in political officialdom. 
Furthermore, the news media includes critical viewpoints if there is political elite opposition 
whereas media marginalises critical perspectives if there is bipartisan agreement over policies. 
This performance likely leads the media to focus on issues that were highlighted by 
parliamentary officials. As a consequence, perspectives critical of government actions are not 
sufficiently reported if they have not been debated in official circles. This has great 
implications: Jonathan Mermin (1999: 6) argues that if critical views existent in society are 
ignored or marginalised when they have not been articulated in official government circles, 
then press performance contradicts ‘the First Amendment ideal of a press independent of 
government’.  
 
Elite ‘indexing’ and ‘manufacturing consent’ also suggest criticism in the media to deal with 
tactical/procedural and not fundamental/substantive issues because officials tend to agree on 
‘first principles [i.e. fundamental/substantive issues] even if they disagree on how to translate 
those principles into policy [i.e. tactical/procedural issues]’ (Althaus 2003: 383; see also 
Hallin 1989: 110; Hertog 2000: 613; Robinson et al. 2009: 538).  
 
The ‘manufacturing consent’ paradigm established by Edward S. Herman and Noam 
Chomsky (2008) further explains media performance with the fact that due to limitations in 
time and resources journalists have to largely rely on official sources and public relations 
during the news selection process. Moreover, the media’s integration in the global market 
system and consequent constraints are regarded as factors as to why the media largely adopt 
the frames and explanatory models provided by officials (see Herman und Chomsky 2008).  
 
The internet with its myriad information channels has yet not been able change such pattern 
because the large majority of online news organisations are subsets of traditional news 
providers. Furthermore, traffic is heavily concentrated and users largely rely on online news 
syndicated by traditional media that display the same pattern of coverage described above 
(see Curran 2012: 19-20; McChesney 2013). Nonetheless, digital communication provides the 
potential for more diverse media coverage (see Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2010). Moreover, 
scholars found that after the unfolding of sudden, dramatic and uncontrollable non-routine 
events, political institutions were not able to set the agenda (e.g. Bennett, Lawrence and 
Livingston 2007: 10-11). Such event-driven news is facilitated by new technologies, such as 
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mobile devices, which enable journalists to abandon their conventional working routines and 
may thus be evident in coverage of international affairs with their ‘steady stream of wars, 
terrorist incidents, famines, and humanitarian crises’ (Livingston and Bennett 2003: 367). 
Indeed, studies suggest that the media provided more diverse coverage since the end of the 
Cold War and this might partly relate to technological changes (see Entman 2004; Robinson 
et al. 2010).  
 
Research on German media representations of war does not allow for broad conclusions 
because the interaction between the media and political system has not been sufficiently 
studied (see Löffelholz 2004: 38). Moreover, in comparison to Anglo-American scholarship, 
which has produced a large amount of theoretically grounded empirical studies, academic 
work on German media coverage of international conflict is deficient – it lacks theoretical 
underpinnings and reference to other research (see Eilders and Hagen 2005: 208; Löffelholz 
2004: 54). On the other hand, the work of German scholar Christiane Eilders (2005) indicates 
that the ‘indexing’ norm also applied to coverage of the 1999 intervention in Kosovo and the 
2003 Iraq War. As Eilders (ibid: 642) concludes about German media performance: ‘[…] 
parliamentary consensus is reflected in media opinion, and the media system consequently 
lacks its most important basis for acting as monitor and critic.’  
 
The aim of this article is to assess the relevance of hegemonic, elite-driven models by 
investigating how the Fallujah case was represented in the US, UK and German press.  
 
Thematic analysis 
This study relies on the thematic analysis developed by the Glasgow University Media Group 
(GUMG) (e.g. Philo and Berry 2011). Greg Philo and Mike Berry (ibid: 174) argue that 
during public controversies, explanatory perspectives or themes compete in struggles for 
legitimacy. In the context of this study, explanatory perspectives explain the reasons, 
justifications and goals for government, military and other policies (see Philo and Berry 2011: 
187, 348-349; also Hammond 2007: 19). If perspectives are linked to interests, they can be 
classified as ideologies (i.e. interest-linked perspectives) (ibid).  
 
Thematic analysis as a methodology investigates the prevalence of official and alternative 
explanations in media content. Substantial imbalances in the distribution of official and 
alternative explanations would point to the applicability of hegemonic models of media 
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performance. As Philo (2012: 151) argues, explanatory themes are ‘contested and the main 
purpose of propaganda […] is to achieve dominance for particular ways of understanding’. 
On the other hand, the heavy inclusion of alternative explanations would be evidence for the 
applicability of pluralist models of media performance. Accordingly, Philo and Berry (2011: 
176) argue that the existence of a range of explanations indicates the adherence to the 
requirement of journalistic balance. 
 
It is also of interest how critical the media evaluated different perspectives. In media studies, 
criticism is regarded as important: Entman and Page (1994: 82) hold the opinion that ‘how 
much critical distance the news can [emphasis in the original] develop from the position taken 
by the president and his administration’ is ‘one of the central issues in the study of media and 
foreign policy’.  
 
Hegemonic models would be confirmed if media-criticism is confined to procedural/tactical 
while marginalising substantial/fundamental criticism. As Chomsky explains, media ‘reflect 
the range of debate over tactical questions among dominant elites’ (1989: 11). ‘Controversy 
may rage’, Chomsky argues, ‘as long as it adheres to the presuppositions that define the 
consensus of elites’ (ibid: 48). Within this universe, Chomsky stresses, professional 
journalism can operate with integrity and commitment (ibid: 11). In this sense, the media are 
not monolithic, however, diversity is bounded by an elite consensus. Hence, under such 
considerations, the procedural/tactical nature of criticism is part of hegemonic reporting. 
 
It is generally understood that procedural/tactical criticism scrutinises the choices, means, 
conducts and outcomes of policies or the qualities of leaders (see Hertog 2000: 613; also 
Robinson et al. 2009: 538). This includes a review of political (e.g. diplomacy, support for 
local groups, the general situation etc.) and military strategies (e.g. use of forces, choice of 
forces, outcomes like casualties and destruction etc.) (Herman and Chomsky 2008: 189-190; 
Hertog 2000: 613). In contrast, substantial/fundamental criticism is concerned with basic 
doctrines (i.e. first principles or fundamental objectives) of foreign policy, nefarious 
behaviour patterns or ethical standards (see Hertog 2000: 613, 618; also Althaus 2003: 383; 
Robinson et al. 2009: 538).  
 
An assessment of criticism can be linked to the thematic analysis. Official explanations might 
be criticised on procedural/tactical grounds. Additionally, alternative explanations constitute 
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substantial/fundamental criticism. As a consequence, the prevalence of alternative 
explanations would also point to the media’s use of substantial/fundamental criticism and thus 
more pluralist reporting than a hegemonic model predicts. 
 
Method of research 
This study uses quantitative content analysis in order to assess ‘the inclusion or exclusion of 
certain types of [...] explanations’ (Philo and Berry 2011: 175). Particularly, the frequency 
and placement of official and alternative explanations was measured (see Philo and Berry 
2011: 348).  
 
An official explanation was coded if a newspaper mentioned explicitly or implicitly one or 
more of the justifications, reasons, aims, or goals of the Fallujah ‘operation’ as raised by 
US/Coalition officials. Officials had argued that the military attack was necessary to (1) 
defeat, crush or weaken the resistance in Fallujah, (2) prepare for the upcoming Iraqi 
elections, or (3) stabilise, democratise, or otherwise liberate Fallujah and Iraq. These 
explanatory themes were important because they related to the broader official justifications 
that had been given for the Iraq invasion conducted in March 2003 and the subsequent 
occupation. 
 
Alternative explanations were coded if a newspaper mentioned explicitly or implicitly one or 
more justifications, reasons, aims, or goals of the Fallujah ‘operation’ which were in 
disharmony with those given by the US/Coalition. Alternative explanations largely emerged 
from Iraqi actors and groups as well as the Western anti-war movement and its supporters in 
the intellectual community. Iraqi and anti-war actors and organisations had argued that the 
military attack was conducted to: (1) collectively punish Iraqi civilians; (2) crush the 
resistance because it set an example by defying US/Coalition power; (3) destroy the resistance 
because it threatened US/Coalition ambitions to privatise the Iraqi economy/oil; and or (4) 
undermine civilian support for the resistance by targeting the population. These explanatory 
themes were important because they de-stabilised the official explanations and suggested that 
the US/Coalition set up a neo-colonial regime in Iraq. 
 
The two sets of explanations were initially determined through a close reading of newspaper 
articles and secondary sources. A code book, to be used as a guideline by the author and two 
second coders, was established that included definitions for official and alternative 
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explanations. Explanations were identified in sentences or paragraphs and if an article 
included at least one explanation it was coded. Hence, the primary unit of analysis was the 
article. There were a few articles that included official and alternative explanations. In such 
instances, both occurrences were coded and the article was displayed as mixed. This was done 
in order to keep mutual exclusiveness of the categories (see Holsti 1969: 99). If a news item 
procedurally contested official explanations it was still coded as official because such 
criticism did not question the validity of the official rationale (i.e. it did not question the 
ideological content of the explanation). A total of 428 items were coded. They included news, 
editorial and commentaries. 10 per cent of the data set was coded by second coders and 
reliability figures were acceptable.1  
 
The thematic analysis was complemented by a qualitative content analysis based on a 
procedure outlined by David Altheide (1996). Altheide (ibid: 2) blends ‘the traditional notion 
of objective content analysis with participant observation to form ethnographic content 
analysis [all emphasis in the original]’. Ethnographic content analysis (ECA) refers to the 
researcher’s way of interacting with documents (ibid). ECA uses a research protocol to 
identify ‘questions, items, categories, or variables’ in order to structure the data collection 
process (ibid: 26). ECA, therefore, relies on ‘qualitative’ categories that include ‘text, 
narrative and descriptions’ and can additionally incorporate ‘quantitative’ categories that 
count certain attributes of the text (ibid: 27). That is why ECA is suitable to be used in 
conjunction with ‘quantitative’ content analysis.  
 
When conducting ECA, each news item has its own protocol sheet comprising of categories 
covering the content to be assessed (ibid: 28). The data collected in each category are 
compared to identify similarities and differences in order to establish typical and extreme 
cases (ibid: 41). These types or clusters can then be displayed in case study analysis (ibid: 42). 
 
In this study, ECA was used as follows: (1) Similarities and differences within the 
explanatory categories were clustered to identify different types of explanations (see Miles 
and Huberman 1994: 69); (2) the handling of official and alternative explanations was 
assessed in relation to external evidence; (3) the media’s use of criticism was coded and 
related to the explanations. Criticism was merely studied qualitatively. This was regarded as 
necessary because of the multi-dimensionality and ambiguity of criticism.  
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The content analyses survey the first two weeks after the US ‘operations’ in Fallujah 
November 2004 unfolded. A two-week period was chosen because it includes the indicative 
peak coverage of the ‘operations’ (Esser, Schwabe and Wilke 2005: 320; Mermin 1999: 42) 
and is long enough to capture critical angles that might have developed later (Mermin 1999: 
42). 
 
The newspaper sample 
This study compares US, UK and German national press news coverage. Generally, 
comparative, international research based on CA is regarded as an important research area 
(see Alexseev and Bennett 1995: 396) and comparative studies are desiderata in the field 
(Hallin and Mancini 2010: 103-104; Löffelholz 2004: 38, 54).  
 
For practical reasons, this study is confined to an assessment of national elite newspaper 
coverage. Such a selection is in accord with a ‘best-case approach’ which looks at those 
media that are regarded as having ‘large foreign news staffs, high prestige and sophistication, 
and a record of willingness to take on the government’ (Entman 2004: 77). Hence, findings of 
such a study, although limited, might still be a good indicator for the general performance of a 
given media system. 
 
The study assesses coverage in The New York Times and Washington Post. Both are the 
leading agenda-setting media in the USA and can be regarded as the newspapers most widely 
read by American politicians, economists, academics and journalists. The UK sample 
incorporates the national ‘quality’ titles The Guardian, The Independent, The Times, and The 
Daily Telegraph as well as their respective Sunday papers The Observer, The Independent on 
Sunday, The Sunday Times and The Sunday Telegraph. These newspapers can be seen as the 
major agenda-setting media in the UK whose main target audiences are the professional elites 
or ‘upmarket’ audiences. The German sample comprises the five so called ‘German national 
prestige newspapers’ whose editorial position can be measured on a left-right scale and who 
are regarded as representative for the entirely political spectrum in Germany (Eilders 1999: 
304, 308; Eilders and Lüter 2000: 418). They include, on the very left-hand side, the 
tageszeitung and, on the opposite right-hand side, Die Welt. Between them, located from left 
to right, are the Frankfurter Rundschau, Süddeutsche Zeitung, and Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (Eilders 1999: 304).  
 
10 
 
Fallujah: background and official explanations 
About 15,000 US/Coalition soldiers took part in the November ‘operation’ in Fallujah which 
the US/Coalition named ‘Operation Phantom Fury’ (Camp 2009: 123, 131, 169; U.S. 
Department of Defence 2004). The battle plan provided a frontal attack with six battalions 
entering Fallujah from the north then pushing southwards on a three mile line accompanied by 
tank platoons as well as artillery and air support (Camp 2009: 128; West 2005: 268). About 
3,000 resistance fighters were entrenched in Fallujah together with an expected number of 
50,000-100,000 civilians, according to an 8 November estimate by General George Casey, 
Commander of the Multinational Force in Iraq (U.S. Department of Defence 2004). 
 
On 4 November 2004, two days after being re-elected as US-president, George W. Bush 
portrayed the US/Coalition as a stabilising force that supported a newly constituting Iraq with 
its actions in Fallujah: 
 
 In order for Iraq to be a free country, those who are trying to stop the elections and stop 
a free society from emerging must be defeated. And so Prime Minister Allawi and his 
government, which fully understands that, are working with our generals on the ground 
to do just that. (Bush cited in The New York Times 2004: 20) 
 
The official goals of the ‘operation’ were to crush the ‘insurgency’ and its leadership which, 
according to officials, constituted of former Ba’athists, local tribesmen, foreign Islamist 
fighters, and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi said to be the top al-Qaida terrorist in Iraq, residing in 
the city. At the official US Department of Defense meeting, on 8 November, General Casey 
described the rebellion as an ‘amorphous group of insurgents and terrorists’ (U.S. Department 
of Defence 2004) which had hijacked Fallujah as a hub for its activities.  
 
Findings 
The following section discusses the frequency and prominence of explanatory items featured 
in coverage as identified with quantitative content analysis. Afterwards, in the next section, 
the press’s explanatory themes are to be discussed in more detail and on the basis of the 
qualitative content survey. This includes an assessment of the different clusters of official and 
alternative explanations. Moreover, it will be discussed how the alternative explanatory 
context was marginalised in the press. As part of this discussion, the prevalence of criticism 
will be highlighted and contextualised. Regarding the data display, the interpretations of 
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explanations in news coverage will not be discussed consecutively, on a country-by-country 
basis, as this is beyond the scope of this study.  
 
Frequency and prominence of explanatory items  
As table 1 shows, the press’s explanatory theme for the US assault on Fallujah predominately 
constituted of explanations put forward by the US/Coalition.  
 
Considering the amount of official explanatory items, The Guardian in which still 75 per cent 
of articles carrying explanations were coded as official, ranked at the lowest end. In the other 
British newspapers roughly 80 per cent of articles featuring explanations were coded as 
official, with slight differences: The Independent came to 79 per cent, The Daily Telegraph to 
80 per cent and The Times to 81 per cent. This was quite similar to the left-leaning German 
Frankfurter Rundschau which registered 78 per cent in this category. The New York Times 
and The Washington Post scored higher with 87 and 88 per cent respectively. These 
differences are likely related to the political distance and the US-newspapers exemplified 
greatest ideological closure.  
 
In the other German newspapers all explanatory articles mirrored the official rationale (100 
per cent). A possible reason for the German press’s dominance of official explanations could 
be its reliance on agency copy and generally low quantity of coverage. The news selection 
process of agencies is heavily routinised and in accord with dominant news values which 
transport official views. Secondly, there was nearly no ‘on-site’ reporting by German 
journalists stationed in Iraq who could have included different perspectives. The low quantity 
of coverage further suggested that the German media was less interested in the Fallujah story 
which was rather detached from German politics.  
 
As table 1 further reveals, the Guardian incorporated the largest amount of articles featuring 
alternative explanations: 21 per cent of explanatory articles were coded in this category. 
Significantly, four out of five alternative explanatory articles were provided by comment 
writers and published on consecutive dates in the back pages (these were two columnists and 
two outside contributors). Of 40 news items in the Guardian, only one featured an alternative 
explanation. This suggests that regular news coverage in the Guardian did not significantly 
differ from that in the American newspapers in regard to the explanatory theme. 
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The Independent included a slightly lower amount: 17 per cent of explanatory articles 
included alternative explanations. Here, three out of four articles were actually news items. 
The Times carried alternative explanations in two explanatory news articles (7 per cent), 
which was the same amount as identified in The Washington Post. The other newspapers did 
not feature articles which solely carried alternative explanations. In the New York Times, the 
Daily Telegraph and the Frankfurter Rundschau alternative explanations were only carried in 
conjunction with official ones. Such articles were coded as mixed. The New York Times 
featured four mixed articles in the explanatory category (14 per cent). The Daily Telegraph 
and the Frankfurter Rundschau came to two which still constituted about 20 per cent of all 
explanatory articles. The Times had three mixed explanatory articles and The Independent, the 
Guardian and The Washington Post came to one each.  
 
If all alternative and mixed explanatory articles are considered, the British press was quite 
congruent in providing the largest amount of mixed/alternative explanations of the three 
countries under review.  
 
Table 1: Number and percentages of articles featuring official, alternative and 
mixed explanations  
 NYT WP G I T DT FR SZ TAZ FAZ W 
N total 82 45 52 47 45 34 25 24 20 25 29 
- news 71 38  40 39 38 28 21 21 17 19 25 
- opinion 11 7 12 8 7 6 4 3 3 6 4 
Explanation 30 25 24 24 27 10 9 7 6 7 12 
Official 26 22 18 19 22 8 7 7 6 7 12 
% (of total) 32 49 35 40 49 24 28 29 30 28 41 
% (of expl.) 87 88 75 79 81 80 78 100 100 100 100 
- news 22 18 14 14 19 7 5 4 4 3 8 
 - opinion 4 4 4 5 3 1 2 3 2 4 4 
Alternative 0 2 5 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
% (of total) 0 4 10 9 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
% (of expl.) 0 8 21 17 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 
- news 0 2 1 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
- opinion 0 0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mixed 4 1 1 1 3 2 2 0 0 0 0 
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% (of total) 5 2 2 2 7 6 8 0 0 0 0 
% (of expl.) 14 4 4 4 11 20 22 0 0 0 0 
- news 4 1 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 
- opinion 0 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 
 
Generally, the findings are conservative because articles were used as the unit of analysis. If 
paragraphs or sentences had been coded the amount of official explanations would have been 
higher. On the other hand, and as previously noted, statements which questioned official 
explanations on procedural grounds were included in this category because they accepted the 
credibility of the official rationale and were thus not regarded as alternative. That is why the 
low amount of alternative explanatory articles should not be regarded as evidence for an 
uncritical press. It could also be argued that a quantitative advantage of official over 
alternative explanations was inevitable because the procedural discussion of official policies 
is to be expected in liberal democratic press systems. 
 
Notwithstanding, the overwhelming quantitative advantage of official over alternative 
explanatory articles, ranging between 75 to 100 per cent, suggested that officials acted as 
‘primary definers’ (Hall et al. 1978: 58). As a consequence, and in further accord with 
‘indexing’ (see Bennett 1990), all newspapers overrepresented the official explanatory theme.  
 
This is further supported by the prominence given to official explanations as indicated in 
tables 2 and 3. Alternative explanations were virtually not carried on the newspapers’ front 
pages. Only the US-American press included alternative explanations in three page one 
articles (see table 2). The same applied to headlines and first paragraphs in which only the 
British press incorporated a marginal amount of alternative explanations (see table 3). 
Surprisingly, the Guardian’s news section used the highest amount of official explanations in 
headlines or first paragraphs. Similarly, the New York Times gave high prominence to official 
explanations (see table 3).  
 
Table 2: Explanations in front page articles 
 NYT WP G I T DT FR SZ TAZ FAZ W 
Official 11 4 4 4 2 3 2 2 1 4 1 
Alternative 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 3: Explanations in headlines or first paragraphs 
 NYT WP G I T DT FR SZ TAZ FAZ W 
Official 5 5 11 5 4 3 4 4 2 2 5 
Alternative 0 0 3 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
The qualitative context of official explanations in news coverage 
In the qualitative survey of press coverage, all identified official explanations were clustered 
into three categories. US/Coalition actions in Fallujah were broadly explained with reference 
to one or more of the following official themes: 
  
(1) Enable elections/democracy/security/stability,  
(2) battle/eliminate insurgents/rebels/terrorists/Zarqawi/resistance fighters, and/or  
(3) liberate/free/help/control/retake Fallujah/Iraq. 
 
As the labelling of the clusters and the ‘quantitative’ assessment suggest, there were differing 
explanations and variations in regard to the descriptions of the resistance. Some news items 
emphasised a terrorist element others painted a picture of a domestic insurgency consisting of 
local Iraqi fighters and former Ba’athists. In rare instances, articles included statements 
classifying the uprising as a resistance movement fighting a reasonable war against the 
US/Coalition. Yet significantly, the existence of the resistance in Fallujah was generally 
referenced in order to explain the assault. This is evidence that it was regarded as problematic 
in nature.  
 
The explanations provided by the US/Coalition could vary in dependence on the different 
spokespersons that were quoted. Critical newspapers also assessed whether the official aims 
of the ‘operation’ were tactically manageable. Some newspapers opposed a military assault on 
tactical grounds because it was assumed that the proclaimed aims could be reached with other 
policies. In some cases, articles included official explanations together with statements that 
were opposed to US/Coalition actions. 
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Because the explanatory themes were placed across sentences and paragraphs there was also 
room for thematic variations if other sections of the news items were considered. 
Sporadically, the press included fundamental criticism in its reporting and it seems such 
statements were incorporated due to professional newsgathering practices (see Althaus et al. 
1996). For example, actors of the newly established Iraqi political elite, who voiced such 
criticisms, had become news sources worthy to be ‘indexed’ by the press. Moreover, there 
were country-specific features. For instance, the German press, which was less critical in its 
regular reporting and relied more heavily on agency material, still featured critical statements 
in its news analyses.  
 
Yet significantly, despite of these differences, virtually all official explanatory themes 
accepted the credibility of the US/Coalition and suggested the need to police in Fallujah in 
order to stabilise Iraq. And due to the dominance of official explanations, this thematic 
emphasis diffused into other parts of coverage suggesting the existence of a dominant 
explanatory theme.  
 
An indicative example of news coverage was a front-page article by London Times’ 
diplomatic editor Richard Beeston (2004) on 9 November. The article included official 
explanations that fit into all categories. According to Beeston (ibid: 1): 
 
 The US intends to [...] force the insurgents into a fight. By seizing the rebel 
headquarters, the Americans hope to stabilise Iraq long enough for elections to take 
place in late January. 
 The primary focus is to eliminate Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian-born terrorist 
whose suicide bombings have made Iraq ungovernable. [...] 
 Iyad Allawi, the Iraqi interim Prime Minister, said: “We have seen more criminal acts 
committed by these terrorists who continue to use Fallujah as a base for their operations. 
We have no other option but to take necessary measures to protect the Iraqi people.” 
[all emphasis added] 
 
This example also shows how ambiguous terms such as ‘insurgents’ were contextualised as 
problematic. Here, this is done by suggesting their defeat would stabilise Iraq and by 
connecting the movement with Zarqawi and terrorists. 
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In the same fashion, on 9 November, a title story in the Frankfurter Rundschau (AP/DPA 
2004: 1) paraphrased Ayad Allawi stating he had authorised ‘Fallujah’s liberation from 
“terrorists”’. The sub-heading of an Independent front-page article by Kim Sengupta and 
Justin Huggler (2004: 1, 4) proclaimed on the same day: ‘US forces fight street-by-street in 
bid to wrest town from Iraqi insurgents.’ And in a 10 November story on the Washington 
Post’s title, Jackie Spinner, Karl Vick and Omar Fekeiki (2004: A 1) wrote: ‘U.S. and Iraqi 
leaders hope the assault will break the grip of insurgents who have held Fallujah for nearly 
seven months.’ While the latter two examples do not depict the ‘insurgents’ as problematic 
even in these cases a military assault appears to be reasonable because the ‘insurgents’ 
controlled the town.   
 
It is well established by Gatekeeper studies that news coverage in the corporate-capitalist 
press is routinised and attempts to consider statements by authoritative spokesperson. 
Considerations of efficiency lead news organisations to rely on ‘routine channels for 
newsgathering’ (Sigal 1973: 187) and ‘“routinized events”’ such as press conferences, official 
hearings and speeches by authoritative persons (Epstein 2000 [1973]: 32). That explains why 
official explanations appeared to be ‘indexed’ by the Western press.  
 
However, professional standards of objectivity and balance tempt journalists to include 
critical statements particularly during times of official conflict (see Althaus 2003). And as 
already indicated, critical articles involving tactical considerations about the official 
explanation could be found in all newspapers. This performance related to official elite 
conflict within and between the US and UK governments about how to handle occupation 
policies. News items included evaluative statements discussing if the enunciated policies of 
overwhelming military force were appropriate means to reach the officially proclaimed goals. 
Critical views could be related to actors from various elite fractions including US, British and 
Iraqi officials as well as Iraqi religious organisations. Criticism was also generated from non-
elite actors such as UN-personnel, Western experts, Iraqi civilians, or members of relief 
organisations. 
 
Accordingly, an 8 November Independent article by Kim Sengupta (2004a: 26) stated: ‘The 
UN secretary general, Kofi Annan, has voiced fears that an assault could trigger a wave of 
violence that could jeopardise the January elections.’ Annan, who generally accepted the right 
of the US/Coalition to occupy Iraq, was further mentioned with this tactical concern in news 
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coverage of The New York Times, The Guardian, the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the Frankfurter 
Rundschau and the Tageszeitung. Generally, Annan was cited more frequently in the liberal 
German and British press than in the US-American. 
 
Another example appeared in a 10 November front-page article in the conservative German 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Rainer Hermann cited a warning by the Sunni politician 
Adnan Pachachi, who was part of the former Governing Council (IGC), that the Fallujah 
operation might increase ‘the bitterness and the instability in the Country’ (Hermann 2004: 1). 
‘Should many people be killed’, Hermann (ibid) paraphrased Pachachi, ‘the Iraqis could 
rethink their readiness for their participation at the elections in January’. Concerns that high 
civilian casualties could endanger the official aims of the Coalition were frequently voiced in 
the newspapers under review.  
 
In the Frankfurter Allgemeine, Hermann (2004: 1) further displays a highly critical statement 
by Harith al Dhari, the General Secretary of the Association of Muslim Scholars, saying he 
regarded the resistance as legitimate and describing the Fallujah assault as a ‘massacre’ (cited 
in ibid). This is an example where an official explanatory item which is generally supportive 
to US/Coalition actions includes substantive criticism. Yet, the article did not go further in 
providing an alternative explanation. If the operation was a massacre, could there have been 
other operational goals than to defeat an ‘insurgency’ and enable elections? Such a question 
was not asked. The Frankfurter Allgemeine did not include critics such as Dhari on a regular 
basis. Furthermore, if newspapers transported such deviant statements they were often 
embedded within quotes voiced by officials. Indeed, it was striking that al Dhari’s indignant 
concerns were also reported on 10 November in the New York Times, the Washington Post, 
the Guardian, and The Times, and on 11 November, in the Frankfurter Rundschau. Yet, all 
these newspapers did not quote al Dhari’s statement labelling the assault as a ‘massacre’. The 
newspapers were only able to quote al Dhari’s other statements which encouraged Iraqis to 
boycott the election which he claimed was to be held ‘over the corpses of those killed in 
Fallujah’ (cited in Spinner, Vick and Fekeiki 2004: A 1) and to protect the Iraqi people ‘from 
injustices by all means’ (cited in McCarthy 2004: 4). The handling of this dissident source 
demonstrates how comments that were incompatible with the official explanatory theme were 
marginalised and excluded. Such views are not regularly considered because it is anticipated 
that extensive deviant coverage increases the costs for journalists and news operations 
because it causes complaints by authoritative sources and investors. Hence, this example 
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illustrates how it is much easier for journalists to follow official over alternative perspectives 
thereby only including criticism emerging from elite circles. Finally, it should be mentioned 
that US troops later raided al Dhari’s house and arrested him (Filkins and Worth 2004). This 
episode did not elicit any concern in the newspapers under review although the raid was 
reported in the New York Times, Washington Post and Die Welt (see Filkins and Worth 2004; 
Kalnoky 2004; Vick and Sebti 2004). 
 
Explanatory articles criticising tactical aspects of the assault were frequently voiced. In the 
New York Times’ 10 November edition, Edward Wong and Eric Schmitt (2004: 1) cited 
‘American military officials’ who had ‘said that they anticipated a surge in violence timed to 
the Falluja invasion’. Furthermore, ‘military officials in Baghdad and Washington are 
expressing concern that the operation could end up being both a public relations disaster and 
strategic setback if some top leaders are not captured’ (ibid). This provides an example of 
how procedural criticism which questioned official explanations still accepted the validity of 
US/Coalition goals. Criticism thus operated as a corrective for the varying tactical policies 
which could be employed. 
 
Tactical criticisms evaluating as to whether the military strategy was jeopardising the 
officially proclaimed goals were part of news coverage of all countries under review and, as 
in the above case, correlated with elite conflict. 
 
The qualitative context of alternative explanations in news coverage 
The November attack on Fallujah had enraged Arab populations in the Middle East, the Iraqi 
Sunni community, whose leaders threatened to boycott the upcoming elections, and the Iraqi 
Shiite communities. Because prominent Sunni and Shiite spokespersons had, to some extent, 
become part of the range of legitimate debate, their criticisms were mentioned in the press. 
This encouraged the inclusion, albeit marginal, of alternative explanations. Thus, newspapers 
incorporated alternative explanations only sporadically and, as mentioned above, in many 
cases they were provided by Arab sources. Moreover, alternative explanations in news 
coverage were rather featured at the bottom of the inverted pyramid and in the back-pages. 
Furthermore, they often appeared as isolated quotes and in the context of procedural criticism 
of US/Coalition actions. Commentaries also included alternative explanations and in rare 
instances a developed alternative explanations could be identified in a comment piece (see 
examples below).  
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All identified alternative explanations were clustered into three categories. US/Coalition 
actions in Fallujah were broadly explained with reference to one or more of the following 
alternative themes: 
 
(1) attack/fight/kill/massacre Fallujah’s/Iraq’s people, or Islam, 
(2) act as a terrorist/crusader/imperialist/oppressor, and/or 
(3) prevent elections/democracy/security/stability. 
 
An example was a 10 November article in the New York Times in which Wong (2004a: 14) 
discussed the Iraqi Islamic Party’s ‘withdrawing from the interim Iraqi government’ (ibid). 
The article included the following alternative explanation: 
 
  […] Moktada al-Sadr, the popular Shiite Muslim cleric […], said through a spokesman 
that the attack on Falluja ‘is an attack on all the Iraqi people,’ and that Iraqis must not 
help the American forces [emphasis added]. (ibid)  
 
Alternative perspectives regarded US/Coalition actions as nefarious. In this case, it was 
suggested that the assault on Fallujah was virtually an attack against the Iraqi population (see 
added emphasis).  
 
A closer examination of all alternative explanatory articles in the sample indicated a broader 
Iraqi discourse which argued that the assault directly targeted the civilian population. On 9 
November, Spinner and Vick of the Washington Post cited a statement by the Association of 
Muslim Scholars, which represented Iraq’s 3,000 Sunni Muslim clerics, warning Iraqi soldiers 
not to participate in the assault which was, as the Association stated, not about ‘fighting 
terrorists from outside the country’ but about ‘fighting the townspeople and targeting its men, 
women and children’ (cited in Spinner and Vick 2004: A1; see also La Guardia 2004: 4). 
Similarly, the Associations leader, al-Dhari, appeared in a 14 November New York Times 
article by Wong claiming what Fallujah was going through was ‘genocide at the hands of the 
occupiers’ (cited in Wong 2004b: 13). Mohsen Abdel Hamid, the leader of the Iraqi Islamic 
Party, which had resigned from the IIG in protest of the offensive, had the same view which 
was presented in a 10 November article by Sengupta in the Independent: ‘The American 
attack on our people in Fallujah has led and will lead to more killings and genocide without 
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mercy from the Americans.’ (cited in Sengupta 2004b: 4) In the 11 November Independent, 
Kim Sengupta (2004c: 4) cited Dr Sami al-Jumaili, who had witnessed an US air strike that 
hit a clinic in Fallujah killing 20 Iraqi doctors and dozens of civilians, with the words: ‘I 
really don’t know if they want to tackle the insurgents or the innocent civilians from the city.’ 
In the Frankfurter Rundschau, Erwin Decker (2004: 2) cited an Iraqi civilian saying the 
Americans would ‘proceed against a large population of the city’. 
 
The handling of the Iraqi sources demonstrated how the press mitigated the alternative 
explanatory theme. For instance, the announcement by the Association of Muslim Scholars 
was mentioned in two other articles in Die Welt and the New York Times. Yet, both 
newspapers excluded the critical alternative explanation (i.e. ‘fighting the townspeople and 
targeting its men, women and children’ (Spinner and Vick 2004: A 1)). Perhaps more 
importantly, the Association of Muslim Scholars had, in October 2004, held a conference 
during which it publicised announcements that featured several alternative explanations (see 
e.g. Janabi 2004). Yet again, in many cases newspapers only mentioned the Association’s 
demand for an election boycott without providing the alternative and substantive context it 
had actually raised at its conference. Moreover, like the ‘massacre’ quote discussed earlier, al-
Dhari’s ‘genocide’ statement was ignored and not published in any other newspaper than the 
New York Times (see Wong 2004b: 13). In the same fashion, the Iraqi Islamic Party’s 
resignation from the IIG was reported on 10 November in 11 news items throughout all 
countries under review. But its chairman’s statement saying the assault was leading to 
‘genocide’ was only published in the Independent of the same day (Sengupta 2004b: 4). 
These examples suggested that deviant statements which depicted US/Coalition actions as 
nefarious were extenuated. 
 
Three news articles mentioned or discussed the Iraqi and international Arab media discourse 
on Fallujah (see Darwish 2004; MacFarquhar 2004; Theodoulou 2004). In a short news item 
published in the 9 November Daily Telegraph, Adel Darwish (2004: 4) summarised the Arab 
media discourse as follows: 
 
 A few – mainly newspapers in Iraq – saw the offensive as an attempt to ensure elections 
are held in January, but most accused the Americans of isolating the city in preparation 
for a massacre of civilians [emphasis added]. 
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It appeared to be significant that alternative explanations could have been prominently 
featured in the Arab media and might have been held by a majority of the Arab world. This 
would mean a striking discordance between Arab and Western press discourses.  
 
In general, a comprehensive reading of all alternative explanations indicated the existence of a 
different discourse. However, in each newspaper this perspective was not developed and 
alternative explanatory statements appeared as garbled information. While news items 
prominently carried the US/Coalition perspective – taking its representatives as lead sources 
on numerous occasions – the same standard was not applied to spokespersons of the 
Association of Muslim Scholars, the Iraqi Islamic Party or the Iraqi resistance, who largely 
remained confined to back spaces.  
 
The Qualitative explanatory context in editorials and commentaries 
Editorials provided further criticism about the feasibility of the Fallujah operation. Yet, even 
the most critical editorial writers were not able to establish a rationale for the attack on 
Fallujah that substantially deviated from the administration line. It was particularly striking 
that editorials were entirely devoid of alternative explanations. 
 
The following examples are indicative of critical editorials: On 9 November, the Guardian’s 
editorial scrutinised the range of the given official explanations and criticised Prime Minister 
Allawi. For instance, the Guardian (2004: 21) wrote: ‘the aim – backed by Tony Blair’ was 
‘to “pacify” Falluja before January’s elections’. However, critics such as ‘Javier Solana, the 
EU’s foreign policy chief, publicly questioned whether the elections would indeed be able to 
go ahead on schedule, all but accusing Mr Allawi of deliberately distorting the picture’. The 
Guardian worried about civilian casualties, the Sunnis’ participation in the political process 
and an inflation of violence – issues seemingly neglected by Allawi (ibid). Despite such 
critiques, the Guardian accepted the official explanatory theme that Fallujah was part of ‘the 
centrepiece of the US-British exit strategy and of hopes that post-Saddam Iraq can progress 
towards democracy and stability’ (ibid). 
 
The German Süddeutsche Zeitung (Münch 2004: 4) displayed the official view in a 10 
November editorial, writing the USA were enforcing a ‘decision’ in Fallujah: ‘A quick 
victory [...] could be a signal for the whole country’ (ibid).  Furthermore, the newspaper 
backed the assault suggesting: ‘The resistance can [...] only be broken militarily.’ (ibid) About 
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the rebel regime in Fallujah, the newspaper wrote: ‘Reports suggest there is Taliban style 
strictness in the inside, terror is spread to the outside.’ (ibid) Again, despite of the usage of a 
seemingly positive term like resistance the movement is contextualised as problematic. 
Considering US/Coalition actions, the Süddeutsche Zeitung raised tactical concerns about 
civilian casualties which could enhance ‘the dangers of this mission’, the newly established 
Iraqi Army, which was part of the assault and could hardly survive a long fight against its 
fellow citizen, and the Sunnis which might be ‘further radicalising’ as a result (ibid). 
 
As a preliminary conclusion it appears to be striking how all newspapers’ editorials accepted 
the officially established first principles of US/Coalition policies when explaining the assault 
on Fallujah – to enable ‘democracy’ and ‘stability’ – and only acted as correctives in regard to 
the appropriateness of secondary (i.e. procedural or tactical) means which were employed. As 
common tactical considerations the press suggested the use of diplomacy and inclusion of the 
Sunni minority in the democratic process. When it became apparent that the ‘operation’ had 
not reached its proclaimed aims the newspaper included a range of tactical criticisms.  
 
Commentators have larger leeway than editorial writers because their perspectives do not 
need to reflect the line of a newspaper. Comments can thus include personal views or those by 
actors from other institutions.  
 
The US press only provided official explanations in its commentary pages. The British press 
featured a broader spectrum of commentary writers. The Guardian stood out for featuring the 
largest amount of commentaries including alternative explanations.  
 
In his 10 November comment, Ramadani (2004: 30) explained Fallujah as ‘defiance of a new 
empire’ because ‘Bush and Blair, not the Iraqi resistance’ feared ‘free elections’. 
Consequently, Ramadani argued, the US/Coalition aimed at crushing ‘the Iraqi people’s will 
to resist occupation and legitimise a puppet regime next January by occupying Fallujah’ 
(ibid). This would also require a crushing of ‘the symbol of Fallujah, to teach the rest of Iraq a 
bloody lesson’ (ibid). Similarly, writing on 17 November, Zangana (2004: 26) compared 
Fallujah with ‘collective punishment’. According to Zangana (ibid): 
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 Since the nominal handover of sovereignty on June 30, we have witnessed an escalation 
of Israeli-style collective punishment of Iraqi cities. Civilian carnage, coupled with 
enormous damage to homes and infrastructure, has became our daily reality. 
 
Both authors placed the assault on Fallujah within a neo-colonial framework implicating that 
the US/Coalition aimed at violently establishing a ‘pro-US order’ (Ramadani 2004: 30) and 
robbing the ‘country’s resources’ (Zangana 2004: 26). Moreover, the uprising was regarded as 
legitimate resistance.  
 
Alternative explanations were also included in two further Guardian comments by Madeleine 
Bunting (2004) and Naomi Klein (2004). Generally, in the Guardian’s comment pages, 
alternative explanations prevailed. The comments by Bunting, Ramadani, Klein and Zangana, 
appearing on 8, 10, 13, and 17 November, represented the critical end of the explanatory 
discourse in the Guardian and perhaps in all newspapers under review.  
 
In the Independent of 13 November, Anthony Sampson (2004) included an alternative 
explanation. Sampson (2004: 41) compared the attack on Fallujah with the tactic of ‘Shock 
and Awe’ saying it ‘was designed to instil fear, even terror’. Again, there is no further 
elaboration of state terroristic tactics. Moreover, Sampson (ibid) appeared to be concerned to 
lend support to the Americans advising them to ‘change their image’, because, ‘it is crucial 
that the Americans – and the British who are now more closely implicated – are seen as 
peacemakers rather than as warmongers’. Other commentaries in the Independent would only 
feature the official explanation.  
 
Three commentaries in The Times carried official and alternative explanations. For instance, 
Jenkins (2004: 16) refuted the official set of explanations saying US troops would not be able 
to hold or stabilise Fallujah and could not rely on the new Iraqi army for that purpose either. 
Furthermore, Jenkins (ibid) provided the following alternative explanation: ‘The Pentagon’s 
handling of the Sunnis seems designed to ensure that they boycott elections and thus speed 
the break-up of Iraq.’ Jenkins alleged that the US goal was to encourage sectarian conflict in 
order to have a justification for staying in Iraq. Jenkins did not follow this argument to its 
logical conclusion. If that was the goal of the USA, then the occupation had not failed but 
rather entered into a new phase of destabilising the Iraqi society. Yet, such an explanatory 
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theme could not be elaborated in all newspapers under review because the US/Coalition was 
regarded as a benevolent force. 
 
A comment in the German Frankfurter Rundschau, which provided one of the two alternative 
explanations in the set of German newspapers, made a similar point as Jenkins. According to 
Karl Grobe (2004: 3) ‘democracy’ was ‘driven out’ by ‘force of arms’ in Iraq and the 
‘perpetrators’ of these policies were ‘seated in Washington’. Nonetheless, Grobe’s criticism 
appeared to be procedural, because, as he (ibid) also stated, ‘Fallujah must be liberated’.  
 
In general, German commentaries provided virtually no alternative explanations and thus 
operated within the official explanatory theme which suggested that Iraq needed to be 
democratised and that the US/Coalition was a legitimate actor fighting an uprising in Fallujah. 
On the other hand, there were some important differences in comparison with the Anglo-
American writers regarding procedural criticisms. The German commentators, particularly in 
the left-liberal newspapers, appeared to be more critical towards the use military force in 
Fallujah. For instance, in a 10 November commentary, the Frankfurter Rundschau’s Dietmar 
Ostermann (2004: 3) abided to the official explanation that ‘the rebel stronghold Fallujah 
shall be brought under control’. But, the author criticised how a radicalised US strategy had 
‘no mercy with the Sunni voter’.  
 
In the comment sections of the Western press, there were variations: In the New York Times 
and Washington Post commentators relied on the official explanatory theme and where 
sympathetic to the US/Coalition. The British press provided the most critical commentary 
discourse. Perhaps because of its political distance, the German press did also not feature 
alternative explanations in this category, with the Frankfurter Rundschau as the only 
exemption. However, commentaries in the left-liberal newspapers (Frankfurter Rundschau 
and Süddeutsche Zeitung) heavily scrutinised official explanations on procedural grounds and 
were cautious towards the use of military force. Die Tageszeitung was less critical in carrying 
official explanations. The conservative papers (Frankfurter Allgemeine and Die Welt) largely 
included commentaries in support of the official rationale. 
 
Conclusion 
The explanatory composition of newspapers across countries was relatively similar. This 
performance supports the assumption put forward by Nacos et al. (2000: 41), that in 
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consideration of ‘the increasingly international scope of news organisations, one would expect 
that reporting on international issues is quite similar in the United States, Italy, France, 
Germany, and other comparable democracies’. But such homogenous press performance has 
political implications: The official explanation had a significant quantitative advantage over 
alternative/mixed explanatory articles: 108:18 news items, 12:0 editorials and 24:9 
commentaries. If the placement of explanations in news items is considered, official 
explanations attained higher prominence and news stories were mostly built on official 
perspectives. Alternative explanations appeared only cursory and in the back pages and were 
often not granted the necessary space for contextual development. Evidence also suggests that 
alternative voices were muted. The existence of a few alternative explanations within the 
official explanatory theme and the infrequent inclusion of critical commentaries based on 
alternative explanations can hardly compensate for the Western press’s failure to develop an 
alternative framework in its news and editorial coverage. Explanations were largely based on 
the official proclaimed aim to establish ‘democracy’ and ‘security’ and criticism procedurally 
questioned the means and justifications of policies. And yet, a several Iraqi actors sourced in 
coverage argued that the US/Coalition was targeting the population during its effort to 
institute a neo-colonial regime. But, this context was not further developed in the press 
although evidence in support of this perspective was available at the time of reporting (see 
evidence in Schwartz 2007; Holmes 2007; Zollmann 2011). Consequently, alternative 
explanations and substantive criticism remained subordinate in the fashion theorised by 
hegemonic models (see Hall 1977: 345-346; Herman and Chomsky 2008; Bennett, Lawrence 
and Livingston 2007).  
 
Procedural/tactical criticism was, however, substantial arguably surpassing the criticism 
found during coverage of the initial Iraq War phase: the outcomes of policies, the official 
definitions of and military approaches applied against the Fallujah resistance, and the broader 
US/Coalition Iraq strategy were under heavy tactical scrutiny. This supports the prediction 
brought forward by Robinson et al. (2010: 181-182) that during the occupation phase the 
press would critically cover the quagmire scenario. Nonetheless, it should also be noted that 
tactical criticisms largely focused on the USA. The UK press for example, heavily scrutinised 
the US/Coalition administration led by Washington as well as US-military tactics. And most 
significantly, procedural/tactical criticism does not refute the applicability of a hegemonic 
model which ‘argues, from its foundations, that the media will protect the interests of the 
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powerful [i.e. the corporate sector], not that it will protect state managers from their 
criticisms’ (Chomsky 1989: 149). 
 
If countries are further compared, the US media were the least open to fundamental criticism 
and included, together with the German press, the largest amount of official explanations (in 
relative terms). The British and German press were more adversarial in their use of procedural 
criticism. Such variations might, as Nacos et al. (2000: 41) further postulate, ‘reflect distinct 
national and regional interests, policies, and politics’. In fact, regional elites had converging 
interests in Iraq. For instance, the British oil industry was initially not in favour of an 
invasion. Furthermore, there were important political differences between the US and the UK 
as well as German governments. Anthony DiMaggio (2009: 55) points out how differences in 
economic and military investments can impact on foreign policy reporting. For instance, the 
USA has larger economic and military stakes in the Middle East than Britain as well as 
Germany and this might increase elite pressure on the media (cf. ibid). Several studies on the 
Iraq War, indeed, found more critical and diverse coverage in the UK and Germany than in 
the USA (see Eilders 2005: 640-641; Kegel 2003; Krüger 2003; Robinson et al. 2010). 
Differences in coverage also support the assumption that the European media enable greater 
spaces for media diversity in sources and opinions (see DiMaggio 2009: 52-55; Hallin and 
Mancini 2010; Robinson et al. 2010: 177; Sparks 2007: 77). However, this should not divert 
from the more important fact that the explanatory context provided in the US, UK and 
German press shielded the rationale of a military ‘operation’ which, in the words of 
independent journalists Amy Goodman and Denis Moynihan, can be situated ‘among the 
most violent and devastating attacks on a civilian population in recent decades’ (cited in 
Jamail 2007: xi).  
 
In conclusion, the international press displayed strikingly similar ideological areas which 
appear to be in accord with a trans-Atlantic state-corporate elite consensus. It was quasi off 
debate, that the Fallujah ‘operations’ could have been launched in order to crush a popular 
resistance which aimed to prevent the West from accessing the mineral resources of its 
country. Instead, as my discussion on the explanatory themes revealed, the Western press 
largely transported the official ideology. This evidences how diversity is bounded within ‘the 
narrow state-corporate ideology’ (Chomsky 1989: 13).  
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Notes 
1  I coded the data together with two further raters, one English coder for the US and UK newspapers and one 
German coder for the German newspapers. 10 per cent of the data set was selected with a random generator. 
The following formula, derived from Holsti (1969: 140), was used: CR = 2M/(N1 + N2). M is the amount of 
coding decisions on which two coders are in agreement, and N1 and N2 describe the number of coding 
decisions administered by raters 1 and 2 (ibid). For the US/UK newspapers the aggregated rating for 
explanations was [.81] for the German newspapers the rating was [.96]. It should also be mentioned that all 
quotes from German newspapers were translated by the author.  
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